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Review and Critique of

Juvenile Justice in Oregon:

An Analysis of the Performance of Oregon's Juvenile Justice System and Specific Recommendations for Improvements

French & Foote (2014)

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October 2014

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My Background

Since 1985 I have been a principle analyst of data the Department of Justice's Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP) collects on juvenile offenders in residential placement. In 1985, I was a Survey Statistician at the Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS), also a component of the federal Department of Justice. I was working on the Children in Custody Census data under an interagency agreement between BJS and OJJDP. After moving to the National Center for Juvenile Justice, the research division of the National Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges, I was involved in OJJDP's redesign of Children in Custody into the Census of Juveniles in Residential Placement (CJRP) and companion Juvenile Residential Facility Census (JRFC). NCJJ has had the responsibility of analyzing these data and disseminating findings under OJJDP's banner since the first wave of CJRP data were collected in 1997.

In addition, NCJJ has been responsible for the National Juvenile Court Data Archive (Archive) since 1975. I have been involved with the project since I joined NCJJ and have been project director since 2008. The Archive provides information on juvenile delinquency and status offense cases handled by the nation's juvenile courts.

I do not do this work alone, especially since I became Director of NCJJ. A small group of NCJJ programmers and researchers processes the data files, conducts analyses, and writes bulletins and reports. The primary vehicle for dissemination of Archive findings is *Juvenile Court Statistics* and the NCJJ-developed data analysis tool called the *Easy Access to Juvenile Court Statistics* (EZAJCS). The primary vehicle for dissemination of the CJRP data is a similar data analysis tool called *Easy Access to the Census of Juvenile in Residential Placement* (EZACJRP) (http://ojjdp.gov/ojstatbb/ezacjrp/default.asp). Like the other NCJJ-developed packages in the Easy Access family of online data analysis tools (http://ojjdp.gov/ojstatbb/dat.html), EZAJCS and EZACJRP use a simple-to-use interface designed to facilitate analysis of the data by even non-technical users (i.e., the public at large). Our responsibilities also include responding to requests for assistance from users. We help them navigate the tools and better understand the data. I am often asked to fact-check reports using these data.

Mr. French and Mr. Foote relied heavily on NCJJ-developed data tools in their report *Juvenile Justice in Oregon: An Analysis of the Performance of Oregon's Juvenile Justice System and Specific Recommendations for Improvements*. They did not, however, contact us for assistance.

The Review Task

I was initially asked to take a look at the French and Foote report and make comments on it by Multnomah County Circuit Court Judge Katherine Tennyson. Judge Tennyson is an officer of the NCJFCJ Board of Directors. I had already seen the report and agreed to take a closer look at it. I was subsequently contacted and hired by Multnomah County Juvenile Services Division Director Christina McMahan to conduct a review of the French and Foote report with respect to data, logic, and methodology, and the accuracy of the conclusions that the report had arrived at, and

was asked to write up my comments and observations so they could be provided to the Multnomah County Juvenile Justice System Assessment Task Force. My review focused on the report's presentations of data made publicly available on the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention's Statistical Briefing Book (http://www.ojjdp.gov/ojstatbb/default.asp) for which the National Center for Juvenile Justice is responsible.

Executive Summary

In *Juvenile Justice in Oregon: An Analysis of the Performance of Oregon's Juvenile Justice System and Specific Recommendations for Improvements* (http://www.clackamas.us/da/documents/JuvenileJusticeinOregon20140929.pdf) authors French and Foote argue against the Annie E. Casey Foundation's Juvenile Detention Alternatives Initiative (JDAI) and the practice changes made since its implementation in Multnomah County in 1995 (and in other counties around Oregon in the years since). They say "Oregon's performance in the Casey Foundation era borders on catastrophic."

The *Juvenile Justice in Oregon* contains many errors. This review focused on the report's presentations of data made publicly available on the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention's Statistical Briefing Book (http://www.ojjdp.gov/ojstatbb/default.asp) for which the National Center for Juvenile Justice is responsible. There are many instances where the report misuses or misinterprets publicly available data. There are instances of what might be called faulty logic. In places, it seems that the authors' core beliefs run counter to current research.

What to take away from this review:

Is the juvenile crime rate up or down in Multnomah County and in Oregon overall?

- There really is no such thing as a juvenile crime rate statistic. Juvenile arrest rates are used as a proxy for juvenile crime rates. Although it's the best alternative, juvenile arrest rates are not the same thing as a crime rate. First only a fraction of crimes ever come to the attention of law enforcement. Second, law enforcement makes arrests in only a fraction of crimes that are reported. Third, individuals are arrested who did not, in fact, commit a crime. Arrest rates were originally developed by the FBI to measure police workloads. Juvenile arrest rates are not only influenced by the behavior of juveniles, but by the behavior of police.
- With these caveats in mind, for Multnomah County, the State of Oregon, and the U.S. juvenile arrest rates are down substantially from the levels of the mid-1990s. The total juvenile arrest rate in Multnomah in 2011 was 74% below the rate in 1994. The rate for Oregon was down 54% over the time frame and the rate for the U.S. was down 52%.
- In 2011, the total juvenile arrest rate in Multnomah County in was 21% below the rate for the U.S. and 42% below the overall rate for Oregon.

Are property crime arrest rates higher in Multnomah County and in Oregon than in the rest of the country?

- The juvenile arrest rate for Property Crime Index offenses (burglary, larceny-theft, motor vehicle theft, and arson) in Multnomah was 15% above the U.S. rate and 16% below the rate for Oregon as a whole. All three showed a declining trend since 2008, but the decline was sharpest for Multnomah County (-47% vs. -25% for Oregon vs. -22% for the U.S.).

Are juvenile drug arrest rates here in Multnomah County and Oregon higher than the rest of the nation?

- The juvenile drug arrest rate for Multnomah has been lower than the rate for the U.S. since 2001. In 2011 the juvenile drug arrest rate in Multnomah was 18% below the U.S. rate. The juvenile drug arrest rate for the entire state of Oregon has been above the U.S. since 2004 (slightly until 2010 when the rate jumped). [Note that the U.S. rate is an average for the entire country, so there are some jurisdictions with higher rates and some with lower rates.]

Is Oregon detaining too few juvenile offenders?

- The Census of Juveniles in Residential Placement (CJRP) data show that in 2011 there were 14 states with lower rates of detention than Oregon. In fact, Oregon was one of 12 states showing an increased detention rate from 1997 to 2011.

Do data show that in Oregon only 14.3% of detained juveniles are held in local detention facilities compared with 30.9% nationally?

- The authors have misunderstood, misinterpreted, or misrepresented the data to which they refer. The CJRP data they cite represent the proportion of the total population of juvenile offenders that is in a detained status regardless of facility type.
- Thus, in Oregon, the committed population accounts for a larger share of juveniles in residential placement than is the case nationally.

Is Oregon's proportion of juvenile cases petitioned to court for formal processing the 4th lowest in the country?

- The data presented by the authors are misrepresented. For example, the graph shows Ohio with nearly 100% of delinquency cases petitioned. The problem is that for most of the reporting counties in Ohio reported only petitioned counts. There were only a few Ohio counties that reported their non-petitioned data. That doesn't mean that most counties in Ohio handled all their cases formally, it just means that they didn't report completely.
- Data reported by Oregon indicate that about 31% of cases are petitioned to court. Nationally, the proportion is 54%.

Do OJJDP data show that in Oregon only 7% of state detention beds are used for supervision sanctions (technical violations), compared with 16% nationally?

- No. OJJDP data show that in Oregon, 33% of detained youth are held for technical violations, compared with 22% nationally.
- Detained technical violators as a rate per 100,000 juveniles in the population was 13 for both Oregon and the U.S.

Problems with the French & Foote Report

First let me say that I wholeheartedly endorse the basic concept of the *Juvenile Justice in Oregon* report. Developing and analyzing juvenile justice system performance measures is vitally important for system improvement. In our work NCJJ has often been asked to help jurisdictions bring together key stakeholders and guide the process of deciding what should be the performance measures. That requires starting by answering the question, "What are our goals?" If one's goal is to make sure youth who are charged with certain "adult" crimes do "adult time," then one might decide to measure things like the proportion of arrests prosecuted in criminal court, the proportion of prosecutions that resulted in conviction, the proportion of convictions that resulted in sentences of incarceration, the average duration of those sentences and make comparisons of those measures for juveniles relative to adults. If one's goals are the goals of Balanced and Restorative Justice (BARJ), measures will be selected that tap into community protection, victim restoration and accountability to victims and community for harm caused, and competency development and youth redemption. The resulting measures will be very different.

The areas that I take issue with the *Juvenile Justice in Oregon* fall into three general categories:

- Data errors and misrepresentations
- Faulty logic
- Goals and core beliefs

In some instances these things are tangled together which compounds the impression of bias.

Data errors and misrepresentations: Some examples

On page 8 of *Juvenile Justice in Oregon* the authors present the graph below and state:

> The reduction of juvenile detention is one of the hallmarks of Casey Foundation policy, and Oregon has one of the lowest rates in the nation of pre-adjudication detention for new criminal charges against juveniles (Chart 1).



The statement is cited to "OJJDP, Census of Juveniles in Residential Placement, http://www.ojjdp.gov/ojstatbb/ezacjrp/asp/State_Adj.asp" in footnote 1 although Chart 1 which is adjacent to the statement in the report (reproduced above) is cited to "OJJDP, Easy Access to Juvenile Court Counts" presumably meaning Easy Access to Juvenile Court Statistics http://www.ojjdp.gov/ojstatbb/ezajcs/default.asp. Regardless, the statement is not accurate. The U.S. figure (21% in the graph above) comes from our National Juvenile Court Data Archive data for 2011 (EZAJCS) and represents the national estimate of the proportion of delinquency cases that involve the youth being securely detained at some point between referral to court and disposition. A youth could be detained more than once during the processing of their case, but would be counted as one detained case. The Archive, however, does not publish comparable state-specific statistics. I was not able to locate an Oregon JJIS Detention Report with data comparable in meaning to the U.S. figure from EZAJCS. The Oregon JJIS Detention Report shows the number of pre-adjudication detention admissions as a proportion of "criminal offense" referrals for 2011 was 42% (http://www.oregon.gov/OYA/Pages/jjis_data_eval_rpts.aspx#_Detention).

The authors could have used data from the Census of Juveniles in Residential Placement (CJRP) to compare Oregon's rate of detention to the U.S. total and to other states (with caution). The CJRP collects one-day counts of juveniles in various types of juvenile residential placement facilities that hold juvenile offenders. Our Easy Access tool shows users a table of "detained" juvenile offenders. These are primarily youth held prior to adjudication, but the counts do include some youth held between adjudication and disposition or placement elsewhere. The data are not limited to secure detention centers nor are they limited to pre-adjudication detention for new charges. The detained rate for the U.S. overall in 2011 was 61 per 100,000 juvenile offenders. The rate for Oregon was 40. There are 14 states with a lower rate of "detained" juvenile offenders, ranging from New Hampshire with a detained rate of 3 per 100,000 juveniles



Notes: Rate is based on a 1-day count on the 4th Wednesday of October, 2011.
Detained status=detained pending adjudication, pending disposition, awaiting placement elsewhere regardless of facility type.
Source: Sickmund, M., Sladky, T.J., Kang, W., and Puzzanchera, C. (2013) "Easy Access to the Census of Juveniles in Residential Placement." Online. Available: http://www.ojjdp.gov/ojstatbb/ezacjrp/ asp/State_Adj.asp.

to Washington with a rate of 39 and several states are only slightly higher. Florida's rate was 41, New Jersey's rate was 41, Pennsylvania's rate was 44, and Missouri's rate was 45. Based on these CJRP data one would not conclude that Oregon has one of the lowest rates in the country. However, state comparisons should always be made with caution since many factors influence the use of detention. For example, low detention rates might be expected in states with lower ages of juvenile court jurisdiction, like Connecticut, Missouri, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New York, and North Carolina had in 2011. In such states older youth with higher rates of detention would not be in the juvenile system.

A juvenile justice system's purpose can also be expected to have some influence on detention rates. Florida, New Jersey, Oregon, Pennsylvania, and Washington are states with similar detention rates and are all states grounded in Balanced and Restorative Justice principles. Counties' and states' interest in reducing the use of detention, whether or not they are involved in Casey's JDAI, could also impact detention rates.

In terms of trends in the rate of detention over the course of the CJRP data collection (1997 compared with 2011), Oregon is one of only a few states not showing a decline. Oregon's detention rate has declined, but the peak year was 2003. The 1997 rate was lower than the 2011 rate. In Oregon, the detention rate was 34 in 1997, rose to 63 in 2003, dropped to 38 in 2010, and increased slightly to 40 in 2011. Nationally, the detention rate dropped from 95 in 1997 to 61 in 2011.



Source: Hockenberry, S. 2014. *Juveniles in Residential Placement, 2011*. Washington, DC: OJJDP. http://www.ojjdp.gov/pubs/246826.pdf

In sum, the CJRP show that Oregon does not have one of the lowest detention rates in the nation. In fact, Oregon was one of 12 states showing an increased detention rate from 1997 to 2011.

Also on page 8 of *Juvenile Justice in Oregon* the authors state:

> This disparity with national pre-adjudication rates is seen in detention facility statistics. In Oregon, 14.3% of detained juveniles are held in local detention facilities, which are predominantly used for pre-adjudicatory detention. Nationally, the figure is 30.9%. Only three other states hold a lower percentage of their detained juveniles in detention facilities. [Cited to OJJDP, Census of Juveniles in Residential Placement, http://www.ojjdp.gov/ojstatbb/ezacjrp/asp/State_Adj.asp]

These statements are not accurate. The percentages to which the authors refer do not represent the proportion of detained youth held in local detention facilities. They actually represent the proportion of the residential placement population that is held in a detained status regardless of facility type. In Oregon, of all the youth held on the 2011 CJRP census date, most had been committed to their facility (85%). In comparison, those in a detained status accounted for 14%.

Again, using CJRP data, one can see that nationally, the vast majority of detained juvenile offenders are held in detention centers (86%) most of which are locally operated. Committed offenders (post adjudication) on the other hand are largely housed in group homes (many of which are privately operated) and long-term secure facilities (most of which are state operated). Conversely, the national detention center population is comprised primarily of detained offenders (78%); committed offenders make up just 21% of offenders in detention centers.

Facility type profiles, 2011:

Facility type	Detained offenders	Committed offenders
Total	100%	100%
Detention center	86	11
Shelter	3	2
Reception/diagnostic	2	2
Group home	3	42
Ranch/wilderness camp	0	5
Long-term secure	5	37
Other	0	1

Note: Detail may not total 100% because of rounding.

Offender population profiles, 2011:

Facility type	Detained offenders	Committed offenders
Detention center	78%	21%
Shelter	44	53
Reception/diagnostic	31	69
Group home	3	95
Ranch/wilderness camp	1	98
Long-term secure	6	94
Other	10	90

Note: Detail may total less than 100% because some facilities held youth other than detained or committed youth.

As a matter of routine, OJJDP does not release comparable detail at the state level. NCJJ, however can conduct a special analysis of the CJRP data to see what the detention center use patterns are for Oregon.

On page 10 of *Juvenile Justice in Oregon* the authors present the graph below and state:

> Formal court processing rates in Oregon are also well below the 54% national average for the filing of court petitions. In Oregon, only 30.9% of crimes referred to juvenile department result in formal court charges (Chart 2).



[OJJDP, Easy Access to State and County Juvenile Case Counts, http://www.ojjdp.gov/ojstatbb/ezaco/]

The data presented here are misrepresented. Ohio is shown with nearly 100% of delinquency cases being petitioned. However, the data source only includes data for nonpetitioned cases for a handful of Ohio's counties. The sum of all cases displayed, therefore, was skewed toward petitioned cases because for most counties, the nonpetitioned cases were absent. Similar issues are present for other states. In some instances, this is exacerbated by the fact that the data are

offense-level for the petitioned-only counties, but case-level for counties reporting both petitioned and nonpetitioned.

Petitioning rates are influenced by many factors. In some jurisdictions with a large proportion of cases referred to juvenile court having petitions filed, the pattern stems from law enforcement having a large role in referring juvenile offenders to diversion programs. This can't be seen in the court data because the diversion occurs prior to court referral. Jurisdictions that rely on arrest sweeps such as groups of juveniles suspected of gang activity may see a lower than average petition rate if a large proportion of cases are referred to court without legal sufficiency.

In other jurisdictions where substantial numbers of juveniles are transferred to criminal court, the proportion of juvenile court cases petitioned might be lower because the most serious cases are handled in criminal court.

The authors also state:

> Only Missouri, Montana and Iowa have lower percentages of referrals resulting in court petitions.
>
> Footnote 6: These three states all have juvenile crime rates above the national average.

The implication is that a low petition rate leads to a higher juvenile crime rate. However, the statement is actually referencing juvenile arrest rates. There really isn't such a thing as a juvenile crime rate statistic. Arrest rates are not the same as crime rates. Arrest rates are very influenced by police behavior in addition to the behavior of offenders and victims.

On page 14 of *Juvenile Justice in Oregon* the authors present the graph below and state:

> Another JDAI policy priority is the reluctance to use detention as discipline for supervision violations. Here also, Oregon practices line up with Casey policy. OJJDP records indicate that only 7% of total state detention beds are used for supervision sanctions ("technical violations"), as compared to 16% nationally.



The data are misrepresented. The data the authors present are from a display of offense profiles for all juvenile offenders in residential placement regardless of placement status (combining detained and committed youth, http://www.ojjdp.gov/ojstatbb/ezacjrp/asp/Offense_Adj.asp) but they say that the data represent technical violators as a share of the detention population. The argument being made is that the use of detention for those charged with technical violations is too low.

One gets a different picture looking at juvenile offenders held with a detained status in the CJRP 2011 data rather than detained and committed youth combined. The data show that nationally 22% of detained youth had a technical violation of probation, parole or violation of a valid court order as their most serious offense. The figure for Oregon was 33%. Using rate statistics to make the comparison, Oregon equaled the U.S. average of 13 juvenile offenders held in a detained status for a technical violation per 100,000 juveniles in the population.

A difference in the offense profile of Oregon's commitment population is what deflated the technical violation share of the total residential placement population that the authors chose to use. Technical violations were 13% of commitments nationally, 2% in Oregon. Comparing rates for technical violations shows the U.S. rate of 18 juvenile offenders held in a committed status per 100,000 juveniles in the population and an Oregon rate of 5.

Oregon's relatively small proportion of technical violations among committed youth is offset by the high proportion of person offenses (55% vs. 38% for the U.S.). Within the person offense category, this is driven by sex assault (20% vs. 7% for the U.S.) and simple assault (17% vs. 9% for the U.S.).

On page 14 and 15 of *Juvenile Justice in Oregon* the authors present the graph below and state:

> Additionally, when detention sanctions are used, they are almost always detention sanctions in local facilities as opposed to sanctions to closed custody facilities. Nationally, 12% of closed custody beds are occupied by supervision violators, as opposed to 2% in Oregon (Chart 5).



The data are represented inaccurately. EZACJRP does not display state data by facility type (closed bed). The data are presented for committed and detained placement status (status of the youth not the facility). Counts for the committed population (as is the case for the detained population) include youth placed in nonsecure facilities. The authors reference a 2% figure for Oregon which matches the 2% of Oregon's committed population with technical violations as their most serious offense. The comparable figure for the U.S., as noted above, is 13%.

Starting on page 17 of *Juvenile Justice in Oregon* the authors present a series of graphs showing Oregon's juvenile arrest rates for various offenses and make comparisons with other states and the U.S. overall. The section begins with the following text:

> A preliminary evaluation of Oregon's juvenile justice system was distributed in this process for comment to Oregon's juvenile justice leaders earlier in the year. That preliminary evaluation a memorandum entitled *Oregon Juvenile Justice Policy* focused primarily on juvenile arrest rates as a measure of system effectiveness, on the assumption that justice policy has an effect on crime rates, and that effective juvenile justice policies should produce lower crime rates than ineffective juvenile justice policy (Appendix D). At the outset, the preliminary evaluation found that non-violent juvenile arrest rates in Oregon were among the worst in the nation, a statistic seemingly indicating that Oregon's juvenile policies were not working as well as policies elsewhere. Oregon juvenile justice department leaders disagreed vigorously with this proposition, 19 asserting that juvenile crime rates can in no way be attributed to juvenile policy, and cannot therefore be used as an indicator of system effectiveness (Appendix E.)

Before discussing arrest statistics, a clarification of what the data mean is in order. Included in the Appendix are two documents that provide information users need to understand arrest data and how they can and cannot be used. The first is a page from the annual *Juvenile Arrests* bulletin that NCJJ prepares for OJJDP. The second is information pulled from the FBI's website cautioning users against using Uniform Crime Reporting Data to rank jurisdictions. (Most of their cautionary guidance could be applied to most justice system measures.)

In *Juvenile Arrests* we state that "Arrest statistics report the number of arrests that law enforcement agencies made in a given year—not the number of individuals arrested nor the number of crimes committed." Therefore, as mentioned previously, arrest rates are very different from crime rates. Juvenile arrest rates are often used as a proxy for juvenile crime rates. A crime incident can involve one or more chargeable crimes, one or more victims, one or more offenders, and one or more arrests—or no arrests at all.

Juvenile arrest rates may be the best alternative to a juvenile crime rate, but they are not the same thing as a crime rate. First only a fraction of crimes ever come to the attention of law enforcement. Second, law enforcement makes arrests in only a fraction of crimes that are reported. Third, individuals are arrested who did not, in fact, commit a crime. Arrest rates were originally developed by the FBI to measure police workloads. Juvenile arrest rates are not only

influenced by the behavior of juveniles, but by the behavior of police. The pattern of juvenile arrests for curfew and loitering demonstrates this well. It is not reasonable to think that youth behavior (hanging out late at night) changed as dramatically as the arrest trend did. There may have been some change in youth behavior, but perhaps more importantly there was a change in police behavior. We know that many cities introduced curfew laws during the mid to late 1990s in response to increases in violent crime. Thus, police arrest policies changed. The decline since is likely a combination of youth behavior and police behavior. (See graph below from the Statistical Briefing Book.)

Juvenile Arrest Rates for Curfew and Loitering, 1980-2011



Note: Rates are arrests of persons ages 10-17 per 100,000 persons ages 10-17 in the resident population.

Internet Citation: OJJDP Statistical Briefing Book. Online. Available: http://www.ojjdp.gov/ojstatbb/crime/JAR_Display.asp?ID=qa05219. February 25, 2014.

It is also important to keep in mind that often, sometimes very often, police do not arrest anyone even when they know a crime has occurred. The FBI's clearance statistics indicate the number of crimes for which law enforcement agencies were able to clear, or "close," offenses. According to the FBI's website (http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/crime-in-the-u.s/2011/crime-in-the-u.s.-2011/clearances) clearances can be made in "one of two ways: by arrest or by exceptional means. Although an agency may administratively close a case, that does not necessarily mean that the agency can clear the offense for UCR purposes. In the UCR Program, a law enforcement agency reports that an offense is cleared by arrest, or solved for crime reporting purposes, when three specific conditions have been met. The three conditions are that at least one person has been:

- Arrested.
- Charged with the commission of the offense.
- Turned over to the court for prosecution (whether following arrest, court summons, or police notice).

"In its clearance calculations, the UCR Program counts the number of offenses that are cleared, not the number of persons arrested. The arrest of one person may clear several crimes, and the

arrest of many persons may clear only one offense. In addition, some clearances that an agency records in a particular calendar year, such as 2011, may pertain to offenses that occurred in previous years.

"In certain situations, elements beyond law enforcement's control prevent the agency from arresting and formally charging the offender. When this occurs, the agency can clear the offense *exceptionally*. Law enforcement agencies must meet the following four conditions in order to clear an offense by exceptional means. The agency must have:

- Identified the offender.
- Gathered enough evidence to support an arrest, make a charge, and turn over the offender to the court for prosecution.
- Identified the offender's exact location so they could be taken into custody immediately.
- Encountered a circumstance outside the control of law enforcement that prohibits the agency from arresting, charging, and prosecuting the offender.

"Examples of exceptional clearances include, but are not limited to, the death of the offender (e.g., suicide or justifiably killed by police or citizen); the victim's refusal to cooperate with the prosecution after the offender has been identified; or the denial of extradition because the offender committed a crime in another jurisdiction and is being prosecuted for that offense. In the UCR Program, the recovery of property alone does not clear an offense.

"When an offender under the age of 18 is cited to appear in juvenile court or before other juvenile authorities, the UCR Program considers the incident for which the juvenile is being held responsible to be cleared by arrest, even though a physical arrest may not have occurred. When clearances involve both juvenile and adult offenders, those incidents are classified as clearances for crimes committed by adults. Because the clearance percentages for crimes committed by juveniles include only those clearances in which no adults were involved, the figures in this publication should not be used to present a definitive picture of juvenile involvement in crime."

Murder and nonnegligent homicide (64.8%) and aggravated assault (56.9%) have clearance rates above 50%. That leaves a lot of room for resource and policy changes to impact arrests.

A different look at Oregon and Multnomah arrest rate trends in comparison with the U.S.

Total all offenses

The total juvenile arrest rate in Multnomah County in 2011 was 21% below the rate for the U.S. and 42% below the overall rate for Oregon. The total juvenile arrest rate in Multnomah in 2011 was 74% below the rate in 1994. In the early 2000s, the trend for Multnomah however was erratic. The rate for Multnomah had dropped well below the U.S. rate by 2003, and then jumped up to a level well above the U.S. rate in 2004. By 2011 the Multnomah rate had fallen to a level between the U.S. and Oregon rates. One does not usually see such dramatic ups and downs unless there is a small numbers issue or a problem with the reported data.



Violent Crime Index offenses

The juvenile Violent Crime Index arrest rate trend for Oregon is lower than and generally parallel to the U.S. trend. Between 1994 and 2011, Multnomah's juvenile Violent Crime Index arrest rate dropped 79%, Oregon's dropped 66%, and the U.S. rate dropped 59%. [These percent change figures are very different from those reported in *Juvenile Justice in Oregon.* The difference stems from the different comparison years. The report uses 2001–2011. The figures above are percent change for 1994–2011, the time frame for the available data.]



Note: Violent Crime Index=Murder and nonnegligent manslaughter, forcible rape, robbery, and aggravated assault.

Source: Puzzanchera, C. and Kang, W. (2014). "Easy Access to FBI Arrest Statistics 1994-2011" Online. Available: http://www.ojjdp.gov/ojstatbb/ezaucr/

Property Crime Index offenses

The Oregon juvenile Property Crime Index arrest rates declined substantially but were higher than the U.S. rates, although the difference narrowed over time. Again the trend for Multnomah was erratic. In 1994 the Multnomah rate was slightly above the Oregon rate, by 2011 the county's rate was below the state rate and only slightly above the U.S. rate.

Multnomah's juvenile Property Crime Index arrest rate dropped 72%, Oregon's dropped 67%, and the U.S. rate dropped 60%. Thus although, Oregon's rate remained higher than the U.S. rate, Oregon's improvement in the Property Crime Index arrest rate exceeded the improvement achieved nationally.

[These percent change figures are very different from those reported in *Juvenile Justice in Oregon.* The difference stems from the different comparison years. The report uses 2001–2011. The figures above are percent change for 1994–2011.]



Note: Property Crime Index=Burglary, larceny-theft, motor vehicle theft, and arson.

Source: Puzzanchera, C. and Kang, W. (2014). "Easy Access to FBI Arrest Statistics 1994-2011" Online. Available: http://www.ojjdp.gov/ojstatbb/ezaucr/

While lower arrest rates are generally preferred over higher rates, there are scenarios where one could envision an increased rate being perceived in a positive light. For example, a higher rate might result from an increased awareness of an issue or willingness of victims to report crimes to

police (as has occurred with rape and domestic violence). Similarly, increased enforcement can lead to increased rates, especially for less serious offenses like property crimes and drug and public order offenses. Further, if rates for serious crimes are able to be reduced the result may be a freeing up of law enforcement resources that can be leveraged toward crimes with lower clearance rates. This would lead to an increase in the arrest rates for those lesser crimes.

The property Crime Index is comprised of burglary, larceny-theft, motor vehicle theft, and arson. These 4 offenses do not represent all property crimes, but like a stock index are used to monitor general trends. These offense were selected by the FBI to monitor property crimes, not because of seriousness, but because they were commonly and consistently reported by law enforcement agencies across the nation.

Burglary

Juvenile burglary arrest rates for both Multnomah County and Oregon overall were below the U.S. rate in 2011. For all three, the general trend since 1994 is one of declining rates. Multnomah County's juvenile burglary arrest rate dropped 74% between 1994 and 2011, Oregon's dropped 76%, and the U.S. rate dropped 62%.



Larceny-theft

In Multnomah and in Oregon overall, about 8 in 10 Property Crime Index arrests of juveniles were larceny-theft arrests. Larceny-theft includes shoplifting. Urban and suburban areas often have higher rates of larceny-theft, not because they have a higher proportion of criminals, but because they have more retail businesses (malls and shopping centers) that are where shoplifting takes place.



Motor vehicle theft

In 2011, Multnomah County, Oregon, and the U.S. had very low rates of juvenile motor vehicle arrests. All were below 45 arrests per 100,000 juveniles. Although hard to see on the graph, Multnomah County's rate was 10% below the U.S. rate and 12% below the rate for Oregon.



Arson

Multnomah County's juvenile arrest rate for arson was very erratic over the 1994–2011, but declined 75% by 2011. In comparison the rate for Oregon as a whole declined 72% and the U.S. rate dropped 62%. In 2011, Multnomah's rate was 47% above the U.S. rate and 31% below Oregon's rate.



Drugs

The Oregon juvenile drug abuse arrest rates did not show a consistent trend between 1994 and 2011. Despite the ups and downs, the rates were not substantially different from the U.S. rates until 2007 when the Oregon juvenile drug arrest rates began to diverge from the U.S. rates. Again the trend for Multnomah was erratic. In 1994 the Multnomah rate was not substantially different from the Oregon rate and somewhat below the U.S. rate. By 2011, despite a slight rising trend after 2008, the county's rate was significantly below the state rate and remained below the U.S. rate (-18%).

Multnomah's juvenile drug arrest rate in 2011 was 24% below the 1994 rate. Oregon's rate, on the other hand, was 77% higher in 2011 than in 1994. In comparison, the U.S. rate dropped 17%. [These percent change figures are very different from those reported in *Juvenile Justice in Oregon.* The difference stems from the different comparison years. The report uses 2001–2011. The figures above are percent change for 1994–2011.]



Note: Drugs=Drug trafficking, drug use, possession of drug paraphernalia.

Source: Puzzanchera, C. and Kang, W. (2014). "Easy Access to FBI Arrest Statistics 1994-2011" Online. Available: http://www.ojjdp.gov/ojstatbb/ezaucr/

Faulty logic

One key flaw in logic is the premise that participation in JDAI is the controlling factor leading to low detention rates. However, there is not a direct correspondence between JDAI and low detention rates or absence of JDAI and high detention rates as can be seen from the map below.



Sources: Hockenberry, S. 2014. *Juveniles in Residential Placement, 2011*. Washington, DC: OJJDP. http://www.ojjdp.gov/pubs/246826.pdf and Annie E. Casey Foundation. Where We Work: Juvenile Detention Alternatives Initiative. http://www.aecf.org/where-we-work/

The authors assign credit for reduced violent crime arrest rates to Senate Bill 1/Ballot Measure 11 and blame JDAI for increases in property crime and drug arrests. Their reasoning is a logical stretch at best. As noted in the FBI cautions against rankings (see the Appendix) and the discussion above, there are many, many factors that influence crime and arrest rates. To assign responsibility for changes in arrest rates to any one of those factors cannot reasonably be done without careful study. If Oregon chooses to evaluate either law changes in the state or policy and practice changes stemming from JDAI, such analysis should be conducted using program evaluation methodology to the extent feasible.

It also does not make sense to blame JDAI for an increase in states' drug juvenile arrest rates and not give JDAI credit for a decline in juvenile drug arrest rates in Multnomah County.

One other problem with the report is the time period the authors chose. The percent change figures focus on the comparisons of 2001 and 2011. If JDAI, Senate Bill 1 and Ballot Measure 11 all began in 1995, one would prefer data covering the entire period from 1995 through 2011 or perhaps 1994 through 2011. In addition when covering change over more than a few years, it is preferable to present trend data rather than just percent change statistics because if the trend is anything other than a consistent slope up or down the percent change could be very misleading depending on the comparison years selected. For example, if one chose to calculate a percent change in juvenile murder arrests one would have drastically different results for the 2001–2011 period (-32%) than for 1993–2011 (-81%) or 1980–2011 (-57%).



Source: OJJDP Statistical Briefing Book. Online. Available: http://www.ojjdp.gov/ojstatbb/crime/JAR_Display.asp?ID=qa05202. February 25, 2014.

At times data availability places limits on the comparisons that can be made. But that does not explain the authors' choice of comparison years. The state and county arrest data presented in the Easy Access tool are available for 1994–2011. The national court data in the Easy Access tool are available for 1985–2010. The residential placement data in the Easy Access tool are available for 1997–2011.

Goals and core beliefs

It is unusual these days to hear a voice argue so strongly for a return to the "get tough" mentality that was so common in the 1990s as have French and Foote. Whether driven by liberal sensibilities and soft-headed advocacy or by conservative views and economic realities, the

current trend is for both sides of the political spectrum to agree that the past policies of incarceration as a preferred sanction and criminal court as the court of choice were wrong. Not only were they bad decisions, they were costly—both in terms of short-term, out-of-pocket expenses and long-term costs associated with failing to improve youth outcomes and the resulting increased recidivism.

Today, advocacy groups like the Annie E. Casey Foundation find themselves in agreement with groups like Right on Crime, a conservative justice reform organization.

On page 7 of *Juvenile Justice in Oregon* the authors state:

> The policies advocated by the Casey Foundation promote drastic reductions in juvenile detention in all stages of delinquency cases, drastic reductions in the involvement of the court system for delinquent youth, and the significant use of "risk tools" rather than personal evaluations and assessments by professionals and judges to determine how the justice system should react to delinquent behavior.

And on page 8:

> At the very core of Casey Foundation policy is the belief that the use of mechanisms such as an "offender risk assessment tool" permit juvenile departments to accurately assess the likelihood that each offender will commit subsequent crimes. The results of these assessments guide the system's response to each delinquent act. These assessment instruments are designed to minimize the influence of personal judgment and discretion in decisions made by juvenile officers, state's attorneys, and judges, and to process offenders based on risk scores and personal developmental needs identified by the tool.

Although the authors argue that the use of risk assessment tools to guide juvenile justice decisionmaking is a bad idea, this is generally an approach recommended by the National Academy of Sciences, National Research Council's 2013 *Reforming Juvenile Justice: A Developmental Approach* (http://www.nap.edu/openbook.php?record_id=14685).

Much of what *Juvenile Justice in Oregon* presents as evidence of a juvenile justice system gone wrong—reduced use of pre-disposition detention, reduced rate of moving cases to formal court processing through petitioning, reduced use of detention as a sanction for violations of conditions of community supervision, and reduced reliance on secure confinement as a disposition for less serious offenders—are the very things that not only advocates, but research studies support. The recommendations made in *Reforming Juvenile Justice: A Developmental Approach* are very much in line with a Balanced and Restorative Justice foundation. There is evidence that states that have embraced these types of reforms are able to reinvest funds saved into the "front end" of the system, to prevention programs and improved integration with the child welfare system.

The idea behind implementing a detention screening tool is to improve the accuracy of detention decisions. There are two types of bad decisions. One is where a youth is detained, but didn't need to be. The other is where a youth is not detained, but should have been. Both of the "bad" decisions (yellow and red bellow) are costly and should be minimized. When the red-bad decision is made, the system tends to find out relatively soon. When the yellow-bad decision is made, the system may never know. The natural tendency is to choose to detain more youth than need to be detained (so lots of kids end up in the yellow-bad) because of fear of not detaining and having the youth do something bad (fear of youth in the red bad) and because the yellow-bad decisions go unnoticed. A jurisdiction will want to understand what the detain/free decision making was like before the screening tool was used, for comparison.

Detention decision matrix

Actual detention decision	Correct detention decision	
	Detain	Not detain
Detain	Good decision	Bad decision • Costly • Harms youth
Not detain	Bad decision • Failures to appear • Harms public safety • Costly	BEST decision

It is virtually impossible to know how many (or what proportion of) youth are in the yellow. Since they were detained, we don't know what would have happened if they were not detained. We are left wondering if it would have been safe to let them remain in the community. The screening tool should be moving youth out of the yellow-bad to the BEST, but we need to make sure they are not moving to the red-bad. It is important to keep in mind that there will always remain some youth in the yellow and red, but their numbers can be minimized.

Alternatives to detention are a way to minimize the risk that youth end up in the red, as are simple changes like reminder notices and transportation that reduce failure to appear.

A validated detention screening instrument can improve the accuracy of detention decisions by guiding decisions regarding who should and shouldn't be detained. Decision making that is guided by data should reduce the natural tendency to make decisions with the goal of avoiding the red without considering that the yellow is also a bad decision. Data driven decision tools can also minimize other decision biases such as implicit bias from which professional judgment suffers (such implicit bias may negatively affect race and ethnicity minority groups, LGBTQ youth, etc.).

Appendix A

United States
Arrest rate of persons under age 18 (per 100,000 persons age 10 to 17)

	1994	2011	Pct chg 1994-2011
Coverage Indicator	**80%**	**77%**	
Total Arrests	**9,146**	**4,396**	-52%
Violent Crime Index	**503**	**204**	-59%
Murder/nonneg. mans.	12	3	-75%
Forcible rape	20	8	-60%
Robbery	184	71	-61%
Aggravated assault	286	122	-57%
Property Crime Index	**2,525**	**1,001**	-60%
Burglary	486	185	-62%
Larceny-theft	1,704	759	-55%
Motor vehicle theft	296	42	-86%
Arson	39	15	-62%
Nonindex			
Other assaults	712	571	-20%
Forgery and counterfeiting	30	5	-83%
Fraud	74	16	-78%
Stolen property	148	40	-73%
Vandalism	514	203	-61%
Weapons	212	84	-60%
Sex offenses (other)	60	38	-37%
Drug abuse violations	534	445	-17%
Driving under influence	47	30	-36%
Liquor laws	410	264	-36%
Disorderly conduct	575	416	-28%
Curfew and loitering	430	230	-47%
Runaways	834	**	–
Population Ages 10 to 17	**29,839,400**	**33,438,000**	12%

These statistics are estimates that account for missing data and may differ from other published sources. The county-level files which are the source of this information are not official FBI releases and are being provided for research purposes.

Suggested Citation: Puzzanchera, C. and Kang, W. (2014). "*Easy Access to FBI Arrest Statistics 1994-2011*" Online. Available: http://www.ojjdp.gov/ojstatbb/ezaucr/

Oregon
Arrest rate of persons under age 18 (per 100,000 persons age 10 to 17)

	1994	2011	Pct chg 1994-2011
Coverage Indicator	**99%**	**98%**	
Total Arrests	**12,873**	**5,983**	-54%
Violent Crime Index	**356**	**121**	-66%
Murder/nonneg. mans.	10	1	-90%
Forcible rape	14	6	-57%
Robbery	119	30	-75%
Aggravated assault	213	84	-61%
Property Crime Index	**4,109**	**1,375**	-67%
Burglary	560	135	-76%
Larceny-theft	2,992	1,165	-61%
Motor vehicle theft	441	43	-90%
Arson	116	32	-72%
Nonindex			
Other assaults	978	468	-52%
Forgery and counterfeiting	64	4	-94%
Fraud	35	20	-43%
Stolen property	63	15	-76%
Vandalism	940	379	-60%
Weapons	203	56	-72%
Sex offenses (other)	102	39	-62%
Drug abuse violations	471	836	77%
Driving under influence	54	23	-57%
Liquor laws	1,102	722	-34%
Disorderly conduct	322	363	13%
Curfew and loitering	1,325	224	-83%
Runaways	1,282	445	-65%
Population Ages 10 to 17	**357,500**	**390,800**	9%

These statistics are estimates that account for missing data and may differ from other published sources. The county-level files which are the source of this information are not official FBI releases and are being provided for research purposes.

Suggested Citation: Puzzanchera, C. and Kang, W. (2014). "*Easy Access to FBI Arrest Statistics 1994-2011*" Online. Available: http://www.ojjdp.gov/ojstatbb/ezaucr/

Multnomah
Arrest rate of persons under age 18 (per 100,000 persons age 10 to 17)

	1994	2011	Pct chg 1994-2011
Coverage Indicator	**100%**	**100%**	
Total Arrests	**13,435**	**3,482**	-74%
Violent Crime Index	**687**	**146**	-79%
Murder/nonneg. mans.	31	2	-94%
Forcible rape	24	5	-79%
Robbery	256	64	-75%
Aggravated assault	375	75	-80%
Property Crime Index	**4,201**	**1,156**	-72%
Burglary	382	98	-74%
Larceny-theft	2,990	997	-67%
Motor vehicle theft	741	38	-95%
Arson	88	22	-75%
Nonindex			
Other assaults	1,034	314	-70%
Forgery and counterfeiting	95	2	-98%
Fraud	39	40	3%
Stolen property	54	3	-94%
Vandalism	781	200	-74%
Weapons	351	56	-84%
Sex offenses (other)	72	21	-71%
Drug abuse violations	483	365	-24%
Driving under influence	51	13	-75%
Liquor laws	527	224	-57%
Disorderly conduct	160	260	63%
Curfew and loitering	2,256	96	-96%
Runaways	1,631	428	-74%
Population Ages 10 to 17	**61,295**	**62,385**	2%

These statistics are estimates that account for missing data and may differ from other published sources. The county-level files which are the source of this information are not official FBI releases and are being provided for research purposes.

Suggested Citation: Puzzanchera, C. and Kang, W. (2014). "*Easy Access to FBI Arrest Statistics 1994-2011*" Online. Available: http://www.ojjdp.gov/ojstatbb/ezaucr/

Appendix B

Most information about law enforcement's response to juvenile crime comes from the FBI's UCR Program

What do arrest statistics count?

Findings in this bulletin are drawn from data that local law enforcement agencies across the country report to the Federal Bureau of Investigation's (FBI's) Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) Program. To properly interpret the material presented, the reader needs a clear understanding of what arrest statistics count. Arrest statistics report the number of arrests that law enforcement agencies made in a given year—not the number of individuals arrested nor the number of crimes committed. The number of arrests is not the same as the number of people arrested because an unknown number of individuals are arrested more than once during the year. Nor do arrest statistics represent the number of crimes that arrested individuals commit because a series of crimes that one person commits may culminate in a single arrest, and a single crime may result in the arrest of more than one person. This latter situation, where many arrests result from one crime, is relatively common in juvenile law-violating behavior because juveniles* are more likely than adults to commit crimes in groups. For this reason, one should not use arrest statistics to indicate the relative proportions of crime that juveniles and adults commit. Arrest statistics are most appropriately a measure of entry into the justice system.

Arrest statistics also have limitations in measuring the volume of arrests for a particular offense. Under the UCR Program, the FBI requires law enforcement agencies to classify an arrest by the most serious offense charged in that arrest. For example, the arrest of a youth charged with aggravated assault and possession of a weapon would be reported to the FBI as an arrest for aggravated assault. Therefore, when arrest statistics show that law enforcement agencies made an estimated 28,200 arrests of young people for weapons law violations in 2011, it means that a weapons law violation was the most serious charge in these 28,200 arrests. An unknown number of additional arrests in 2011 included a weapons charge as a lesser offense.

How do arrest statistics differ from clearance statistics?

Clearance statistics measure the proportion of reported crimes that were cleared (or "closed") by either arrest or other, exceptional means (such as the death of the offender or unwillingness of the victim to cooperate). A single arrest may result in many clearances. For example, 1 arrest could clear 10 burglaries if the person was charged with committing all 10 crimes, or multiple arrests may result in a single clearance if a group of offenders committed the crime. The FBI's reporting guidelines require that clearances involving both juvenile and adult offenders be classified as clearances for crimes that adults commit. Because the juvenile clearance proportions include only those clearances in which no adults were involved, they underestimate juvenile involvement in crime. Although these data do not present a definitive picture of juvenile involvement in crime, they are the closest measure generally available of the proportion of crime known to law enforcement that is attributed to persons younger than age 18.

Crime in the United States reports data on murder victims

Each *Crime in the United States* report presents estimates of the number of crimes reported to law enforcement agencies. Although many crimes are never reported to law enforcement, murder is one crime that is nearly always reported.

An estimated 14,610 murders were reported to law enforcement agencies in 2011, or 4.7 murders for every 100,000 U.S. residents. The murder rate was essentially constant between 1999 and 2006 and then fell 18% through 2011, reaching its lowest level since at least 1980.

Of all murder victims in 2011, 91% (or 13,230 victims) were 18 years old or older. The other 1,380 murder victims were younger than age 18 (i.e., juveniles). The number of juvenile murder victims declined annually since 2007, falling 23% during that 5-year period. By 2011, the number of juvenile murder victims was 52% less than the peak year of 1993, when an estimated 2,880 juveniles were murdered. During the same 2007–2011 period, the estimated number of adult murder victims fell 13%.

Of all juveniles murdered in 2011, 42% were younger than age 5, 69% were male, and 49% were white. Of all juveniles murdered in 2011, 35% of male victims, 58% of female victims, 49% of white victims, and 36% of black victims were younger than age 5.

In 2011, 68% of all murder victims were killed with a firearm. Adults were more likely to be killed with a firearm (70%) than were juveniles (48%). However, the involvement of a firearm depended greatly on the age of the juvenile victim. In 2011, 18% of murdered juveniles younger than age 13 were killed with a firearm, compared with 82% of murdered juveniles age 13 or older. The most common method of murdering children younger than age 5 was by physical assault.

* In this bulletin, "juvenile" refers to persons younger than age 18. In 2011, this definition was at odds with the legal definition of juveniles in 13 states—11 states where all 17-year-olds are defined as adults, and 2 states where all 16- and 17-year-olds are defined as adults.

Source: Puzzanchera, Charles. 2013. *Juvenile Arrests 2011*. http://ojjdp.gov/pubs/244476.pdf

FBI's Caution Against Using UCR Data to Rank Jurisdictions

Variables Affecting Crime

Each year when *Crime in the United States* is published, many entities—news media, tourism agencies, and other groups with an interest in crime in our nation—use reported figures to compile rankings of cities and counties. These rankings, however, are merely a quick choice made by the data user; they provide no insight into the many variables that mold the crime in a particular town, city, county, state, region, or other jurisdiction. Consequently, these rankings lead to simplistic and/or incomplete analyses that often create misleading perceptions adversely affecting cities and counties, along with their residents.

Consider other characteristics of a jurisdiction

To assess criminality and law enforcement's response from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, one must consider many variables, some of which, while having significant impact on crime, are not readily measurable or applicable pervasively among all locales. Geographic and demographic factors specific to each jurisdiction must be considered and applied if one is going to make an accurate and complete assessment of crime in that jurisdiction. Several sources of information are available that may assist the responsible researcher in exploring the many variables that affect crime in a particular locale. The U.S. Census Bureau data, for example, can be used to better understand the makeup of a locale's population. The transience of the population, its racial and ethnic makeup, its composition by age and gender, educational levels, and prevalent family structures are all key factors in assessing and comprehending the crime issue.

Local chambers of commerce, government agencies, planning offices, or similar entities provide information regarding the economic and cultural makeup of cities and counties. Understanding a jurisdiction's industrial/economic base; its dependence upon neighboring jurisdictions; its transportation system; its economic dependence on nonresidents (such as tourists and convention attendees); its proximity to military installations, correctional facilities, etc., all contribute to accurately gauging and interpreting the crime known to and reported by law enforcement.

The strength (personnel and other resources) and the vigor of a jurisdiction's law enforcement agency are also key factors in understanding the nature and extent of crime occurring in that area. Although information pertaining to the number of sworn and civilian employees can be found in this publication, it cannot be used alone as an assessment of the emphasis that a community places on enforcing the law. For example, one city may report more crime than a comparable one, not because there is more crime, but rather because its law enforcement agency, through proactive efforts, identifies more offenses. Attitudes of the citizens toward crime and their crime reporting practices, especially concerning minor offenses, also have an impact on the volume of crimes known to police.

Make valid assessments of crime

It is incumbent upon all data users to become as well educated as possible about how to understand and quantify the nature and extent of crime in the United States and in any of the more than 18,000 jurisdictions represented by law enforcement contributors to the Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) Program. Valid assessments are possible only with careful study and analysis of the various unique conditions affecting each local law enforcement jurisdiction.

Historically, the causes and origins of crime have been the subjects of investigation by many disciplines. Some factors that are known to affect the volume and type of crime occurring from place to place are:

- Population density and degree of urbanization.
- Variations in composition of the population, particularly youth concentration.
- Stability of the population with respect to residents' mobility, commuting patterns, and transient factors.
- Modes of transportation and highway system.
- Economic conditions, including median income, poverty level, and job availability.
- Cultural factors and educational, recreational, and religious characteristics.
- Family conditions with respect to divorce and family cohesiveness.
- Climate.
- Effective strength of law enforcement agencies.
- Administrative and investigative emphases of law enforcement.
- Policies of other components of the criminal justice system (i.e., prosecutorial, judicial, correctional, and probational).
- Citizens' attitudes toward crime.
- Crime reporting practices of the citizenry.

Crime in the United States provides a nationwide view of crime based on statistics contributed by local, state, tribal, and federal law enforcement agencies. Population size and student enrollment are the only correlates of crime presented in this publication. Although many of the listed factors equally affect the crime of a particular area, the UCR Program makes no attempt to relate them to the data presented. ***The data user is, therefore, cautioned against comparing statistical data of individual reporting units from cities, counties, metropolitan areas, states, or colleges or universities solely on the basis of their population coverage or student enrollment.*** Until data users examine all the variables that affect crime in a town, city, county, state, region, or other jurisdiction, they can make no meaningful comparisons.

Source: http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/crime-in-the-u.s/2012/crime-in-the-u.s.-2012/resource-pages/caution-against-ranking/cautionagainstranking